Date: 7 Nov. 2020

Note

This is part of a collection of writings by Murray N. Rothbard.

The original page numbes are in square brackets e.g. [4].

The footnotes have been kept inline.

Table of Contents

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[1]

TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR LIBERTARIAN SOCIAL CHANGE by Murray N. Rothbard

Libertarians have given considerable thought to refining their basic principles and their vision of a libertarian society. But they have given virtually no thought to a vitally important question, that or strategy: now that we know the nature of our social goal, how in the world do we get there? [FN1: “Strategy represents an essential, even though neglected dimension of political activity. While the analogy should not be carried too far, a strategic framework may be viewed as performing a function similar to the function or the price mechanism within the economic system: the allocation of scarce resources among competing goals. In other words, strategy enables a political movement to undertake a systematic and explicit ordering of priorities which in turn enables the movement to allocate its scarce human and financial resources in the most efficient manner possible”. “White Paper on the Massachusetts Libertarian Movement” (unpublished MS., Boston: Center for the Study or Social Systems, Spring/Summer 1976), p. 20.]

To the extent that libertarians have thought at all about strategy, it has simply been to adopt what I have called “educationism”: namely that actions rest upon ideas, and therefore that libertarians must try to convert people to their ideas by issuing books, pamphlets, articles, lectures, etc. Now it is certainly true that actions depend upon ideas, and that education in libertarian ideas is an important and necessary part in converting people to liberty and in effecting social change. But such an insight is only the beginning or arriving at a libertarian strategy; there is a great deal more that needs to be said.

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1. The Necessity of a Movement↩

In the first place, ideas do not spread and advance by themselves, in a social vacuum; they must be adopted and spread by people, people who must be convinced of and committed to the progress of liberty. But this means that liberty can only advance by means of a developing libertarian movement. We must therefore be concerned not only with the ideology but also with developing the people to carry the principles forward. Webster’s defines “movement” in a way clearly relevant to our concerns: “A connected and long continued series of acts and events tending toward some more or less definite end; an agitation in favor of some principle, policy, etc., as, the Tractarian movement; the prohibition movement.”

Some libertarians have criticized the very concept of “movement” as “collectivist”, as somehow violating the principles of individualism. But it should be clear that there is nothing in the least collectivist in individuals voluntarily joining together for the advancement of common goals. A libertarian movement is no more “collectivist” than a corporation, a bridge club, or any other organization; it is curious that some libertarians, while conceding the merits of all other such “collective” organizations, balk only at one that would advance the cause of liberty itself. Neither does joining a movement mean that the joiner must in some way submerge his individual sovereignty to the movement or the organization, any more than the bridge club member must submerge his individuality in order [3] to advance the playing of bridge. The individual libertarian, who places the triumph of liberty high on his value scale, decides to join a movement which is requisite to the achievement of his goal, just as does the member of a bridge club or the investor in a steel manufacturing corporation.

2. Victory as the Goal↩

If the advancement of liberty requires a movement as well as a body of ideas, it is our contention that the overriding goal of a libertarian movement must be the victory of liberty in the real world, the bringing of the ideal into actuality. This may seem a truism, but unfortunately many libertarians have failed to see the importance of victory as the ultimate and overriding goal. In a sense, the fact that so little thought has been given to strategy in the libertarian movement is itself a symptom of the widespread lack of serious intent or dedication to victory in the real world, to the transformation of reality to bring about the libertarian ideal.

Until now, we have been inclined to designate as “libertarians” all people who believe that total individual liberty is the best social system. But, such definition leaves out a necessary ingredient to being a complete libertarian: a dedicated commitment to victory in the real world. Why should libertarians not adopt what might seem to be a self-evident goal? One reason for not making such a commitment is that a person may prefer the libertarian ideal as an intellectual game, something to be merely contemplated without relevance to the real world; another reason for weakening a person’s desire to pursue the goal of victory [4] may be a profound pessimism that he may feel about any future prospects for victory. In any case, holding .he victory of liberty as one’s primary goal is only likely in those persons whose libertarianism is motivated and moulded by a passion for justice: by a realization that statism is unjust; and by a desire to eliminate such glaring injustice as swiftly as possible.

Hence, the utilitarian, who is concerned not for justice and moral principle but only for increased productivity, or efficiency, may believe in liberty as an ideal, but is not likely to place passionate commitment into achieving it. The utilitarian, by his nature, is far more likely to remain content with partial success than to press on to complete victory. As we shall see further below, such a weakening of the will toward victory was partly responsible for the decline of classical liberalism in the nineteenth century.

In addition, some libertarians are primarily motivated by a need for self-expression, by a desire for personal psychological therapy, by intellectual game-playing, or by other goals. However worthy, none of these is sufficient for a commitment to victory; in fact, if dominant, they militate against such a commitment. In recent years, many libertarians have adopted as their major goal not victory, but a Quaker-like desire to bear moral witness to their own libertarian purity, and hence to trumpet their own moral purity over the “impure” others. (This theme has been dominant in Robert Nozick and the “purity faction” of the Massachusetts and New York Libertarian Parties). The [5] result of such overriding concern for purity has been a total absence of strategic perspective or concern. But this must be a futile and time-wasting dead end. There is no libertarianism if it is not directed toward the goal of changing the real world to conform with the libertarian ideal; as Marx put it in his Theses on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”

3. Abolitionism as the Goal↩

It necessarily follows, from our primary goal of victory, that we want victory as quickly as possible. As Mises showed in demonstrating that time preference is a categorical fact of’ human action, people must necessarily prefer the attainment of’ any given end as quickly as possible. And if victory is indeed our given end, an end given to us by the requirements of justice, then we must strive to achieve that end as rapidly as we can.

But this means that libertarians must not adopt gradualism as part of their goal; they must wish to achieve liberty as early and as rapidly as possible. Otherwise, they would be ratifying the continuation of injustice. This means that they must be “abolitionists”, i.e., that if a magic button existed which could bring about the instantaneous victory of liberty, that we must be eager to push that button. A passion for justice, a true commitment to the goal of liberty, then, requires a radical abolitionism, a willingness to “push the button”, if it existed, for the victory of liberty. As Leonard Read once wrote, in advocating the instantaneous abolition of all price and wage controls: “If there were [6] a button on this rostrum, the pressing of which would release all wage and price controls instantaneously, I would put my finger on it and push! . [FN2: Leonard E. Read, I’d Push the Button {New York; Joseph D. McGuire, 1946), p. 3. For more on this topic, see Murray N. Rothbard, “Why Be Libertarian?” in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian Review Press, 1974), pp. 147–51.]

On the other hand, if libertarians themselves were to incorporate gradualism as part of their theory, they would then be conceding that some things are more important, of greater value than, justice and liberty itself. And that would be the death of the libertarian ideal. As the great abolitionist and libertarian William Lloyd Garrison affirmed, “gradualism in theory is perpetuity in practice.”

It is often objected that abolitionism is “unrealistic”, that liberty (or any other radical social goal) can only be achieved gradually. Whether or not this is true (and the existence of radical upheavals demonstrates that such is not always the case}, this common charge gravely confuses the realm of principle with the realm of strategy. As I have written elsewhere:

… by making such a charge they are hopelessly confusing the desired goal with a strategic estimate of the probable outcome. In framing principle, it is of the utmost importance not to mix in strategic estimates with the forging of desired goals. First, one must formulate one’s goals, which … would be the instant abolition of slavery or whatever other statist oppression we are considering. And we must first frame these goals without considering the probability of attaining them. The libertarian goals are “realistic” in the sense that they could be achieved if enough people agreed on their desirability … The “realism” of the goal can only be challenged by a critique of the goal itself, not in the problem of how to attain it. Then, after we have decided on the goal, we face the entirely separate strategic question of how to attain that goal [7] as rapidly as possible, how to build a movement to attain it, etc. Thus, William Lloyd Garrison was not being “unrealistic” when, in the 1830’s, he raised the glorious standard of immediate emancipation of the slaves. His goal was the proper one, and his strategic realism came in the fact that he did not expect his goal to be quickly reached. Or, as Garrison. himself distinguished: “Urge immediate abolition as earnestly as we may, it will, alas! be gradual abolition in the end. We have never said that slavery would be overthrown by a single blow; that it ought to be, we shall always contend.) [FN3: Rothbard, Egalitarianism, p. 150. At the conclusion of a philosophical critique of the charge of “unrealism” and its confusion of good and the currently probable, Professor Philbrook declared: “Only one type of serious defense of a policy is open to an economist or anyone else; he must maintain that the policy is good. True ‘realism’ is the same thing men have always meant by wisdom: to decide the immediate in the light of the ultimate.” Clarence Philbrook, “’Realism’ in Policy Espousal”, American Economic Review (December, 1953), p. 859.]

From a strictly strategic point of view, it is also true that if the adherents of the “pure” goal do not state that goal and hold it aloft, no one will do so, and the goal will therefore never be attained. Furthermore, since most people, and most politicians, will hold to the “middle” of whatever “road” may be offered them, the “extremist”, by constantly raising the ante, and by holding the pure or “extreme” goal aloft, will move the extremes further over, and will therefore pull the “middle” further over in his extreme direction. Hence, raising the ante by pulling the middle further in his direction will, in the ordinary pulling and hauling of the political process, accomplish more for that goal, even in the day-by-day short run, than any opportunistic surrender of the ultimate principle.

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In her brilliant study of the strategy and tactics of the Garrison wing of the abolitionist movement, Aileen Kraditor writes:

It follows, from the abolitionist’s conception of his role in society, that the goal for which he agitated was not likely to be immediately realizable. Its realization must follow conversion of an enormous number of people, and the struggle must take place in the face of the hostility that inevitably met the agitator for an unpopular cause … The abolitionists knew as well as their later scholarly critics that immediate and unconditional emancipation could not occur for a long time. But unlike those critics they were sure it would never come unless it were agitated for during the long period in which it was impracticable…

To have dropped the demand for immediate emancipation because it was unrealizable at the time would have been to alter the nature of the change for which the abolitionists were agitating. That is, even those who would have gladly accepted gradual and conditional emancipation had to agitate for immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery because that demand was required by their goal of demonstrating to white Americans that Negroes were their brothers. Once the nation had been converted on that point, conditions and plans might have been made …

Their refusal to water down their “visionary” slogan was, in their eyes, eminently practical, much more so than the course of the antislavery senators and congressmen who often wrote letters to abolitionist leaders justifying their adaptation of antislavery demands to what was attainable. The abolitionist, while criticizing such compromises, would insist that his own intransigence made favorable compromises possible. He might have stated his position thus: If politics is the art of the possible, agitation is the art of the desirable. The practice of each must be judged by criteria appropriate to its goal. Agitation by the reformer or radical helps define one possible policy as more desirable than another, and if skillful and uncompromising, the agitation may help make the desirable possible. To criticize the agitator for not trimming his demands to the immediately realizable – that is, for not acting as a politician, is to miss the point. The demand for a change that is not politically possible does not stamp the agitator as unrealistic. For one thing, it can be useful to the political bargainer; the more extreme demand of the agitator makes the politician’s demand seem acceptable and perhaps desirable in the sense that the adversary may prefer to give up half a loaf rather than the whole. Also, the agitator helps define the value, the principle, for which the politician bargains. The ethical values placed on various possible political courses are put there partly by agitators working on the public opinion that creates political possibilities. [FN4: Aileen S. Kraditor, Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Critics on Strategy and Tactics, 1834–1850 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), pp. 26–28.]

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Finally, the raising of a goal such as immediate abolition — either of slavery or of the State — has been criticized for being “Utopian”. But it is important to distinguish between a truly “Utopian” goal which is not subject to immediate human will, and a goal which is. Typical of a former goal, which would be impossibly Utopian, are such projects as “the immediate abolition of poverty”, the creation of “the New Socialist Man”, etc. As I have written elsewhere, distinguishing between the two types of “extreme” goals:

Other traditional radical goals (than full liberty) —such as the “abolition of poverty” — are, in contrast to this one, truly utopian; for man, simply by exerting his will, cannot abolish poverty. Poverty can only be abolished through the operation of certain economic factors … which can only operate by transforming nature over a long period of time. In short, man’s will is here severely limited by the working of – to use an old-fashioned but still valid term – natural law. But injustices are deeds that are inflicted by one set of men on another; they are precisely the actions of men, and, hence, they and their elimination are subject to man’s instantaneous will …

In the field of justice, man’s will is all; men can move mountains, if only men so decide. A passion for instantaneous justice — in short, a radical passion — is therefore not utopian, as would be a desire for the instant elimination of poverty or the instant transformation of everyone into a concert pianist. For instant justice could be achieved if enough people so willed. [FN5: Rothbard, “Why be Libertarian?” in Egalitarianism, pp. 148–149.]

That the Garrisonian abolitionists saw this distinction is clear from the historian Anne Loveland’s account:

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Historians have usually misconstrued the immediatist slogan, interpreting it as a temporal rather than a moral and religious requirement …When abolitionists demanded immediate emancipation, they-were … arguing that abolition was fully within man’s power and completely dependent upon his initiative, (and) since action was the test of belief, true repentance virtually entailed the abolition of slavery. [FN6: Anne C. Loveland, “Evangelicalism and ‘Immediate Emancipation’ in American Antislavery Thought”, Journal of Southern History (May 1966), pp. 173, 184–185; cited in Kraditor, Means and Ends, pp. 264–265.

4. Ends and Means↩

If the primary and overriding goal of the libertarian movement must be the victory of liberty as rapidly as possible, then the primary task of that movement must be to employ the most efficacious means to arrive at that goal. If a critic should charge that this is adopting the immoral philosophy that “the ends justify the means”, the proper reply is that of Ludwig von Mises: what else but an end could ever justify a means? The whole point of a means, by definition, is to reach an end; a means is not a goal in itself. Those critics, for example, who attack Communists for being willing to kill capitalists in order to reach the goal of a proletarian dictatorship as “believing that the end justifies the means” are incorrect; the problem with the Communists is not that they believe that the purpose of means is to achieve ends, but that their ends (e.g. dictatorship of the proletariat) are incorrect. For the libertarian, the desired end is a world of liberty, a world where no force is used against non-criminals, against non-invaders of person and property; the [11] libertarian critique of Communist actions, therefore, is that the absence of murder is not an integral part of Communist ends. In short, the libertarian criticism is against Communist goals and principles, and not against their insight into the relationship between means and ends.

To be efficacious, to achieve the goal of liberty as quickly as possible, it should be clear that the means must not contradict the ends. For if they do, the ends are being obstructed instead of pursued as efficiently as possible? For the libertarian, this means two things: (1) that he must never deny or fail to uphold the ultimate goal of libertarian. victory; and (2) that he must never use or advocate the use of un-libertarian means: of aggression against the persons or just property of others. Thus, the libertarian must never, for the sake of alleged expediency, deny or conceal his ultimate objective of complete liberty; and he must never aggress against others in the search for a world of non-aggression. For example, the Bolsheviks, before the revolution, financed themselves partially by armed robbery in the name of “expropriating” capitalists; clearly, any use of aggression against private property in order to finance the libertarian movement, in addition to being immoral by libertarian principles, would cut against those principles themselves and their ultimate attainment.

5. The Role of Transition Demands↩

At this point, any radical movement for social change, including the libertarian movement, has to face an important, realistic problem: in the real world, the goal — for the libertarian [12] the disappearance of the State and its aggressive coercion — will unfortunately not be achieved overnight. Since. that is.the case, what should be the position of the libertarian toward “transition demands”, i.e toward demands that would mov e toward liberty without yet reaching the ultimate goal? Wouldn’t such demands undercut the ultimate goal of total liberty itself?

In our view, the proper solution to this problem is the “centrist” or “movement building” solution that Lenin adopted in the Marxist movement: namely, that it is legitimate and proper to advocate transition demands as way-station along the path to victory, provided that the ultimate goal of victory is always kept in mind and held aloft. In this way, the ultimate goal is clear and not lost sight of, and the pressure is kept on so that transitional or partial victories will feed on themselves rather than appease or weaken the ultimate drive of the movement. Thus, suppose that the libertarian movement adopts, as a transitional demand, an across-the-board 50% cut in taxation. This must be done in such a way as not to imply that a 51% cut would somehow be immoral or improper. In that way, the 50% cut would simply be an initial demand rather than become an ultimate goal in itself and thereby undercut the libertarian goal of total abolition of taxation.

Similarly, if libertarians should ever call for reducing or abolishing taxes in some particular area, that call must never be accompanied by advocating the increase of taxation in some other area. Thus, we might well conclude that the most tyrannical and destructive tax in the modern world is the income tax, and therefore that first priority should be given to abolishing that form [13] of tax; but the call for drastic reduction or abolition of the income tax must never be coupled with advocating a higher tax in some other area, e.g. a sales tax, for that indeed would be employing a means contradictory to the ultimate goal of tax-abolition.

Similarly, libertarians must never fall into the trap of advocating some planned program of transition, such as some sort of Four-Year Plan of what libertarians would do if they achieved political power. For any such program would imply that going further, that rolling back the State by more than the “Plan”, would be improper, and this would cut against the radical abolitionist stance that a devotion to libertarianism requires. On the contrary, libertarians must hack away at the State wherever and whenever they can, rolling back or eliminating State activity in whatever area possible. In short, the State must be treated as an enemy to be hacked away at, rather than as some sort of useful planning tool to be used for its own gradual self-elimination.

As an example, during every recession, Keynesian liberals generally advocate an income tax cut to stimulate consumer demand. Conservatives, on the other hand, generally oppose such a tax cut as leading to higher government deficits. The libertarian, in contrast, should always and everywhere support a tax cut as a reduction in State robbery. Then, when the budget is discussed, the libertarian should also support a reduction in government expenditures to eliminate a deficit. The point is that the State must be opposed and whittled down in every respect [14] and at every point: e.g. in cutting taxes, or in cutting government expenditures. To advocate raising taxes or to oppose cutting them in order .o balance the budget is to oppose and undercut the libertarian goal.

But while the ultimate goal of total liberty must always be upheld, and the State must be whittled down at every point, it is still proper, legitimate, and necessary for a libertarian movement to adopt priorities, to agitate against the State most particularly in those areas which are most important at any given time. Thus, while the libertarian opposes both income and sales taxes, it is both morally proper and strategically important to select, say, the income tax as the more destructive of the two and to agitate more against that particular tax. In short, the libertarian movement, like everyone else, faces a scarcity of its own time, energy, and funds, and it must allocate these scarce resources to their most important uses at any given time.

William F. Buckley, Jr. once attacked the libertarian movement for lacking strategic intelligence, for being more interested in the cause of “denationalizing lighthouses” than in foreign policy. He had a point. While libertarians should indeed favor denationalizing lighthouses, such a goal should clearly have a much lower priority than opposing conscription or war. In short, what particular issues should receive priority depends on the specific conditions of time and place; if, for example, the United States were a small fog-bound island dependent on sailing, shipping, denationalization of lighthouses might well have a high priority.

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6. The Two Main Strategic Deviations↩

Of all the movements for radical social change in modern history, the most self-conscious and the one that has devoted the most thought to the problems of strategy has been the Marxist-Leninist movement. One of the lessons that we can learn from the thinking and experience of that movement is that there are bound to develop, within any radical ideological movement for social change, two broad and important “deviations” from the correct centrist, movement-building line we have been discussing. At one pole is the deviation of “left-sectarianism” and at the other the deviation of “right-opportunism.” Each, in its own way, abandons the hope of victory for the radical goal. The left sectarian, in brief, considers any transition demands, any use of strategic intelligence to determine priorities for agitation, any appeal to one’s audience without sacrificing ultimate principles, in themselves a “sellout” or betrayal of radical principles. In the above example, a left sectarian, for example, would consider the transition call for repeal of the income tax as per se a betrayal of the principle of the abolition of taxation, even though that transition demand were clearly coupled with the ultimate goal of a tax-free society. To take a deliberately ludicrous example, the left sectarian might consider not raising the problem of denationalizing lighthouses in our current society a betrayal of the principle of privatizing lighthouses.

In the Marxist movement, the most notorious example of left sectarianism has been the Socialist Labor Party, which, for nearly a century, has confined itself to saying that socialism is the answer to all world and national problems, refusing to go beyond [16] that to discussing any of the specific facts or problems themselves. Thus, the SLP issues a standard pamphlet, simply calling for the establishment of its brand of socialism, its only negligible concession to currently relevant issues being to change the headline of this same pamphlet from year to year: eg., “Are You Worried About … Unemployment; or Vietnam; or Pollution, etc.?”, the pamphlet simply reiterating that all current problems would be solved by socialism. This refusal to learn about or grapple with the facts of reality, with.,the real-world problems that are currently worrying people, this ritualistic reiteration of the ultimate goal, period, is characteristic of all brands of sectarianism. In the libertarian movement, sectarians will simply reiterate such formulas as the non-aggression axiom, or A is A, or the need for self-esteem, without grappling with detailed issues. The centrist position, in contrast, is to begin agitation around currently important issues, examine them, show the public that the cause of these problems is statism and that the solution is liberty, and then try to widen the consciousness of one’s listeners to show that all other current and even remote problems have the same political cause and solution.

Typical of left-sectarianism in the libertarian movement was the frenzied opposition to Roger MacBride’s rejection of Vice-Presidential candidates for the Libertarian Party in 1975 who were open homosexuals or open tax evaders. MacBride’s reasoning was that, while he favored the libertarian principles of gay rights and of tax resistance, that it would be tactically [17] disastrous to alienate the neophyte public by putting forward candidates who were actual practitioners. The important point here is not whether or not. MacBride was tactically correct in his judgment (probably he was), but the argument of the left-sectarian opposition that MacBride’s position was immoral and a betrayal of libertarian principles. It should be clear that MacBride’s decision was tactical and irrelevant to libertarian moral principle, since there is no principled requirement to dramatize the defense of, say, the rights of heroin-takers by nominating a candidate who is himself a heroin addict.

One form that left-sectarianism sometimes takes is that of “ultra-left adventurism”, that is the advocacy of immediate armed revolution against the existing State without sufficient mass support to be able to succeed. In the modern libertarian movement, this deviation was pervasive during its early stage, at the time of the New Left “revolution” in the late 1960’s and 1970. The collapse of the latter “revolution” as soon as the State began its armed counter-action at Kent State is testimony to one of the most important lessons of history: that no armed revolution has ever succeeded in a country with free elections. All the successful revolutions, from the American and the French in the eighteenth century, to the Russian, Chinese, and Cuban in the twentieth, occurred in a land where free elections were either non-existent or severely restricted. Until or unless the U.S. changes from free elections to dictatorship, then, the question of armed revolution is, at the very least, totally irrelevant to the American scene.

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In contrast to left-sectarianism, which spurns immediate gains toward the ultimate goal, right-wing opportunism openly believes in hiding or working against the ultimate goal in order to achieve short-run gains. An opportunist LP candidate for the state university board in Illinois, for example, never mentioned the ultimate aim of abolishing the public school system, and instead came out for a measured reduction in taxes for schools. Right-wing opportunism is self-defeating for ultimate goals in several ways. The major reason for putting forth transition demands is as a way-station to ultimate victory; but, by studiously avoiding the raising of ultimate goals or principles, the opportunist, at best, short-circuits the ultimate goal, and betrays it by failing to raise the consciousness of the public in the explicit direction of the final goal. The ultimate goal will not be reached automatically, by itself; it can only be reached if a large group of adherents continues to hold high the banner of that ultimate, radical objective. But, if libertarians, for example, refuse to examine and put forward their ultimate goals, who will? The answer is, no one, and therefore that objective will never be obtained. Indeed, if libertarians fail to keep their ultimate objective in view, they will themselves lose sight of the objective, and descend into another gradualist, non-libertarian reform movement, and the main purpose of having a movement in the first place will be lost. Secondly, opportunists often undercut the ultimate objective, and libertarian principle as well, by openly advocating measures that undercut that principle, [19] e.g. by advocating a higher sales tax to replace an income taxa (as did the Mid-Hudson chapter of the Free Libertarian Party in early 1976), or in advocating a gradualist Four-Year Plan to advertise their moderation and alleged reasonableness. This latter advocacy, as I have indicated above, also fails to treat the State as an enemy to be whittled down wherever possible,
and treats it instead as a worthy gradualist instrument of its own reduction. A Four-Year-Plan also unfortunately implies that any more radical time-table for reducing the State would be improper. And finally, even in the short run, opportunism is self-destructive, for any new ideological movement or party must, in order to acquire support — as in the case of new products or firms on the market — differentiate its product from its established competitors. A Libertarian Party, for example, which sounds almost indistinguishable from right-wing Republicanism (as did the Tuccille campaign for New York governor in1974), will fail if only because the voter presented with no clear alternative, will quite rationally remain with right-wing Republicans.

One remote but interesting strategic problem for the Libertarian Party is the question of what a Libertarian President would do in office. Roger MacBride, in his interview in Reason (October, 1976), unfortunately states that not all interventionism should be immediately removed (whether it could politically is another question), thus abandoning the vital principle of theoretical abolitionism. MacBride states that such immediate [20] repeal would “create chaos … the markets would be in chaos” and that therefore, taxation must continue for a time because “The choice is do you cause one kind of human suffering by abolishing taxation and letting the chips fall where they may or do you cause .another kind of human suffering by continuing taxation even though on a reduced scale”. (p. 29). There are two grave problems with this approach. One is that freedom and free-markets are never “chaos”, on the contrary they rapidly bring order out of State-imposed chaos, and in a remarkably brief amount of time. And second, the purpose of libertarianism is not to abolish all suffering – an impossible Utopian dream which no political goal can accomplish, but to abolish all crime, specifically the legalized crime of taxation and government coercion. To state openly that taxation, even if reduced, is preferable to its immediate abolition is to sanction a continuation of crime and aggression, and to cut sharply against the libertarian principle itself.

In sum, both strategic deviations are fatal to the proper goal of the victory of liberty as soon as it can be achieved; left-sectarianism because it in effect abandons victory, and right-opportunism because it in effect abandons liberty. Both sides of this “equation” must be continually upheld.

One curious propensity is that of a certain number of individuals, in the libertarian and other radical movements, to shift rapidly from one diametrically opposed deviation to the other, without ever passing through the correct, centrist position. Apart from psychological instability among these individuals, there is a certain logic to these seemingly bizarre leaps. Take, for example, the left-sectarian, who for years confines his [21] activities to stating pure principle, without ever doing anything in the real world to change the real situation for the better, without trying to transform reality. After several years, discouragement at the lack of progress may set in, after which, desperate for some gains in the real world; the person leaps into right-opportunism — and accomplishes little there as well. (The case of Dana Rohrabacher’s leap from LeFevrianism to Reaganism in 1976, without supporting the Libertarian Party in either instance, is a case in point). On the other band, someone mired in short-run opportunism for years, disgusted with the compromises and immorality of that form of politics, can readily express his disgust and his yearning for pure principle by leaping straight into sectarianism. In neither manifestation, however, is the individual willing to engage in a protracted, lifelong commitment for victory in the real world for principle and as quickly as the goal can be achieved.

7. Lenin’s Strategy and Tactics↩

One way of expressing the centrist strategic insight is to call for “purity of principle, combined with flexibility of tactics”. Probably the most successful historical instance of a continuing, protracted adherence to this centrist line, in opposition to both sectarianism and opportunism, is V. I. Lenin. [FN7: Fortunately, we now have available an excellent, two-volume biography of Lenin, written from an independent (non-Communist Party) Marxist-Leninist perspective, focusing on how Lenin’s strategy and tactics developed and how they led to ultimate success. See Tony Cliff, Lenin: Volume I: Building the Party (London: Pluto Press, 1975); and Lenin: Volume II: All Power to the Soviets (London: Pluto Press, 1976).]

As early as 1902, in What Is To Be Done?, Lenin attacked the [22] contemporary Marxian focus on mere “economism” — bread and butter issues .for the workers – and called for the necessity of educating workers in theoretical socialist consciousness (the ultimate. goal). On the other hand, one of the reasons for the 1903 split in the Russian Social Democratic Party between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks was Lenin’s insistence on the importance of work, of activity in the real world, rather than mere discussion of principles. When, during the Revolution of 1905, the Soviets appeared, as organized groups of workers, Lenin was unique among the Bolsheviks in seeing its potential significance, in seeing that the Soviets had the potential of being the ultimate revolution in embryo. And so Lenin called for the Bolsheviks to join the Soviets and to try to infuse them with radical socialist theory.

a. Entrepreneurial Flexibility of Tactics

Throughout his career, Lenin, above all other Bolsheviks, understood the importance of adapting the tactics of his movement to the historical stages or conditions in which they found themselves. A tactic that might be effective in one historical context or period might be disastrous in another; and Lenin also realized that, particularly during revolutionary crisis periods, such existing conditions can and do change overnight. Furthermore, Lenin constantly fought against the tendency of other Bolsheviks to keep their tactics mired in a previous and obsolete historical context. (During all these periods and changes, of course, Lenin continued to uphold the ultimate banner of proletarian socialism.) Roy Childs has insightfully termed this task of strategic leadership [23] — to learn about and gauge the historical context at all times — the task of “ideological entrepreneurship”, for it is the task of the entrepreneur, or course, to be able to understand current conditions and to project the proper tactics for the near future.

There is another important point to be made here. For, just as entrepreneurship is ultimately an art and not a science that can be learned by rote, so ideological tactics, the findings of the right path at the right time, is an entrepreneurial art at which some people will be better than others — even when all agree on the basic strategic principles. Mises’ insight that timing is the essence of entrepreneurship, and that some people are more able at such timing and insight than others, applies to ideological as well as economic entrepreneurship. Sectarians, however, who can only repeat rote formulas without understanding the importance of entrepreneurial applications or tactical flexibility will automatically call all such entrepreneurial actions “unprincipled” or “inconsistent”, just as many Marxists and others have so accused Lenin.

There is another corollary to ideological entrepreneurship as art rather than a precise science. While it is easy to spot clear-cut, or polar examples of incorrect sectarian or opportunist deviations, it is far more difficult to distinguish them from the correct line in marginal or fuzzy areas. It is precisely in those areas, especially when the movement and its leadership must act rapidly to adjust to changing situations, that the role of the entrepreneurial leader is most important. In a sense, the [24] situation is similar to ideal types in the Aristotelian theory of the “golden mean”. For example, Aristotle identifies correct action as the prudent mean between unwise rashness on the one hand; and cowardice on the. other. While these types can be clearly distinguished in theory, in practice it is often difficult to make such distinctions. Yet, both in the case of Aristotelian applied ethics and in strategy and tactics for radical social change, distinctions must in practice be made.

b. Retreat After the Revolution of 1905

Thus, while radical tactics were proper during the Revolution of 1905, the later years of revolutionary collapse and reaction were times for caution and retreat. Lenin then had to battle against the ultra-leftism of Bogdanov and others within the Bolshevik movement, who called for a futile armed uprising. As Tony Cliff writes of this period:

The terrible period of reaction caused many revolutionaries, especially those in exile, whose opportunities for concrete action were very few, to turn to abstract propaganda. Devoid of practical revolutionary responsibility, this revolutionism was limited to self-glorification, and verbal intransigence became a facade for passive complacency.

When .revolutionaries are isolated from any real support … the conditions are ripe for ultra-leftism … Since practically nobody is listening, why not use extreme revolutionary phrases? In a void, the pressure to adjust to a new situation is minimal. [FN8: Cliff, Lenin, I., p. 283.]

Lenin properly criticized the ultra-leftists and sectarians as being overly impatient with “petty work” in their search for quick results, of failing to understand the importance of what Mao was to call a “protracted struggle” for the ultimate goal.

Here is how Lenin himself characterized the necessary [25] difference in tactics between the period of the Revolution of 1905, and of the post-revolutionary retreat:

During the Revolution we learned to “speak French”,i.e, to … raise the energy of the direct struggle of the masses and extend its scope. Now, in this time of stagnation, reaction and disintegration, we must learn to “speak German”, i.e. to work slowly (there is nothing else for it) until things revive, systematically, steadily, advancing step by step, winning inch by inch. Whoever finds this work tedious, whoever does not understand the need for preserving and developing the revolutionary principles of Social Democratic tactics in this phase too … is taking the name of Marxist in vain … It was necessary to take patiently in hand and re-educate those who had been attracted to Social Democracy by the days of liberty … who were attracted chiefly by the vehemence, revolutionary spirit and ”vividness”of our slogans, but, who, though militant enough to fight on revolutionary holidays, lacked the stamina for work-a-day struggle under the reign of our counter-revolution … (Many) could only repeat old phrases and were unable to adapt the old principles of revolutionary Social Democratic tactics to the changed conditions. [FN9: Lenin, “The Liquidation of Liquidationism”, July 11, 1909, quoted in Cliff, Lenin, I., pp. 284–85.]

Cliff also points out the natural tendency for the leaders of any organization, including Lenin’s own Bolshevik Party, to be unduly “conservative”, to become mired in the tactics and outlook of a now-obsolete historical context:

Why was there this quick turnover among the (Bolshevik) leader.ship? The very process of selecting people to lead the party has dangers inherent in it. The people coming to the top are naturally inclined to shape their methods of work, their thinking and their behavior to fit the specific, immediate needs of the time. The Russian revolutionary movement underwent many changes in course, as a result of changes in the class struggle. A leader who adapted himself to the immediate needs at one stage found himself out of step at the next turn … Hence the higher his place in the party, the more the leader was likely to adapt to immediate circumstances, and the more conservative he became. To repeat Herbert Spencer’s [26] observation; every organism is conservative in direct proportion to its perfection. This applies equally to political organizations. Thus nature turns virtue into vice. Lenin was unique among party leaders in his capacity to adapt, while relentlessly continuing to pursue the same aim — workers power.[FN10: Cliff, Lenin, I.. pp. 357–58.]

c. The April Theses

Lenin’s most formidable strategic and tactical achievement took place in 1917. While he always retained the ultimate goal of the seizure of power by the “working class” headed by the Bolshevik party as its alleged “vanguard”, his own basic strategy, as well as that of the other Bolsheviks, had always been a variant of the classic Marxist position: that first there must be a “bourgeois democratic (or ‘capitalist’) revolution” — in the Bolshevik strategic variant, to be headed by the workers and peasants — and that this revolution must be completed before any Bolshevik seizure of power on behalf of proletarian socialism. By April, 1917, however, when Lenin returned to Russia from exile, Lenin, alone of all the Bolsheviks (to say nothing of the other Marxist or socialist parties), realized. that conditions had totally changed since the advent of “dual power” after the first, successful February 1917 revolution which had overthrown the Tsar. The Soviets, headed by Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, and including a minority of Bolsheviks, operated as a non-governmental “dual power” alongside the more conservative official Russian government. In this new and completely unexpected situation, Lenin alone saw that the proper strategic objective for the Bolsheviks should now be the seizure of power as soon as possible, [27] without tailing behind the Mensheviks and waiting for the completion of the “bourgeois revolution”. It took a month of continual argumentation for Lenin to convert the Bolsheviks to this perspective.

In defending his new strategic view, in his Letters on Tactics (April 8–13, 1917):

Marxism requires of us a strictly exact and objectively verifiable analysis of the relations of classes and of the concrete features peculiar to each historical situation … “Our theory is not a dogma, but a guide to action”, Marx and Engels always said, rightly ridiculing the mere memorizing and repetition of “formulas” that at best are capable only of marking out general tasks, which are necessarily modifiable by the concrete economic and political conditions of each particular period of the historical process …

But at this point we hear a clamour of protest from people who readily call themselves “old Bolsheviks” … My answer is: The Bolshevik slogans and ideas on the whole have been confirmed by history: but concretely things have worked out differently; they are more original, more peculiar, more variegated than anyone could have expected.

To ignore or overlook this fact would mean taking after those “old Bolsheviks” who more than once already have played so regrettable a role in the history of our party by reiterating formulas senselessly learned by rote instead of studying the specific features of the new and living reality. [FN11: In Cliff, Lenin, II, pp. 125–26.]

And Cliff comments: “Lenin had repeatedly to learn from experience, to overcome his own ideas of yesterday, he had to learn from the masses. But, as has happened many times before when history made sharp turns, the old Bolsheviks were noteable to make the quick adjustment needed … Lenin had to repeat again and again: ‘We must abandon old Bolshevism.’ ” [FN12: Cliff, Lenin, II, p. 128. For the startled reaction of Bolsheviks and other Marxists at hearing Lenin’s new revolutionary perspective in his speech on his return to Russia at the Finland Station in Petersburg, see N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 1917. A Personal Record (London, 1955), pp. 272–89.]

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Having converted the Bolsheviks to his new revolutionary strategic perspective, however, Lenin now had to combat the opposite error: to cool down the desire of some of the Bolshevik militants, especially in Kronstadt and Vyborg, for an immediate attempt at armed seizure of power. Cliff entitles one of his chapters “Lenin Lowers the Temperature”, in which Lenin had to emphasize that the Bolshevik vanguard must not get too far ahead of the masses, that they must, before attempting to seize power, patiently explain their strategic perspective to the masses of workers. For one of Lenin’s insights is also a strategic insight of libertarianism: namely, that the development of ideas, the acceptance of ideology, does not take place all at once among the public, but is necessarily uneven, from one individual and group to another. (See below for more on the process of the spread of ideas.) This unevenness — in Lenin’s case, of socialist consciousness — takes place both between groups and even within the Bolshevik (or any other ideological) party. Hence, the importance of raising consciousness of the ideology sufficiently, before attempting radical action.

d. The Line on Kornilov

A particularly interesting example of Lenin’s remarkable ability to find quickly the correct tactical line within his fixed overall goal, in response to very rapidly changing conditions, was his response to the attempted military coup by General Kornilov in late August 1917. Here were Lenin and the Bolsheviks [29] committed to the strategic perspective of revolutionary overthrow of the middle-of-the road Kerensky government as rapidly as possible. But then, in late August, General Kornilov, head of the Russian General Staff attempted a coup from the Right to establish a military dictatorship. In this new situation, the Left Bolsheviks were tempted to continue their previous tactics of all-out opposition to the Kerensky regime and to stand aloof from the battle — but this would probably have meant victory for Kornilov and the probable end of the chances for revolution. In contrast, the right Bolsheviks were tempted to fight unconditionally alongside Kerensky in order to crush the immediately greater Kornilov threat — but that unprincipled action might well have demoralized the Bolshevik militants, and undercut the larger strategic goal of a Bolshevik revolution. Lenin found the correct tactic in between these possibly fatal extremes: namely, to fight with Kerensky in order to crush the Kornilov threat, but at the same time to continue to denounce Kerensky and not only call for his eventual overthrow, but to raise radical demands upon Kerensky, accusing the latter of weakness and vacillation in the common fight against Kornilov.

In his letter “To The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.”, (August 30, 1917) Lenin set forth his subtle but effective line on the new Kornilov situation:

The Kornilov revolt is a most unexpected … and down-right unbelievably sharp turn in events. Like every sharp turn, it calls for a revision and change of tactics. And as with every revision, we must be extra-cautious not to become unprincipled …

Even now we must not support Kerensky’s government. This is unprincipled. We may be asked: aren’t we going to fight against Kornilov? Of course we must! But this is not the same thing; there is a dividing line here, which [30] is being stepped over by some Bolsheviks who fall into compromise and allow themselves to be carried away by the course of events.

We shall fight, we are fighting against Kornilov, just as Kerensky’s troops do, but we do not support Kerensky. On the contrary, we expose his weakness. There is the difference. It is rather a subtle difference. but it is highly essential and must not be forgotten.

What, then, constitutes our change of tactics after the Kornilov revolt?

We are changing the form of our struggle against Kerensky.Without in the least relaxing our hostility towards him, without taking back a single word said against him, without renouncing the task of overthrowing him, we say that we must take into account the present situation. We shall not overthrow Kerensky right now. We shall approach the task of fighting against him in a different way, namely, we shall point out to the people (who are fighting: against Kornilov) Kerensky’s weakness and. vacillation.

Lenin goes on to write a various radical “partial demands” that must be presented to Kerensky by the Bolsheviks, including arming the workers, bringing radical troops to the fore, and legalizing peasant takeovers of landed estates (see below). Lenin adds:

We must present these demands not only to Kerensky, and not so much to Kerensky, as to the workers, soldiers and peasants who have been carried away by the course of the struggle against Kornilov. We must keep up their enthusiasm, encourage them to deal with (i.e. fight against) the generals and officers who have declared for Kornilov, urge them to demand the immediate transfer of land to the peasants.

Lenin concludes:

It would be wrong to think that we moved farther away from the task of the proletariat winning power. No. We have come very close to it, not directly, but from the side. At the moment we must campaign not so much directly against Kerensky, as indirectly against him, namely, by demanding a more and more active, truly revolutionary war against Kornilov … Now is the time for action: the war against Kornilov must be conducted in a revolutionary way, by drawing the masses in, by arousing them, by inflaming them (Kerensky is afraid of the masses, afraid of the people). [FN13: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 25, June-September 1917 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), pp. 285–89. ]

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e. Peace and Land

Perhaps the most important reason for the Bolshevik triumph in 1917 was the party’s hewing consistently to the principled radical line hammered out by Lenin on the two most vital problems of the day: immediate unconditional ending of the war, and legalizing the massive illegal takeovers of land by the peasants from their feudal landlords throughout Russia during 1917. On the most vital question, ending the war, Lenin had braved massive unpopularity by being virtually alone, from the beginning of World War I in 1914, in calling for “revolutionary defeatism”. Lenin’s principled view was that the Marxists of each warring country had the responsibility for calling, not only for an immediate end to the war, but also for the defeat of their own government, and for turning the “imperialist war” into a civil war, i.e. using the war to seize power. Naturally, this view was hardly popular at first in a Russia, or in any other country, where the masses succumbed to the usual patriotic myths and bogeyman fears about (in the case of Russia) conquest by the dreaded Germans. But Lenin clung patiently to this perspective, and, in 1917, the masses became totally weary of the staggering losses at the front, with the soldiers (largely peasants) mutinying and deserting the front in droves. Yet, particularly after the overthrow of the Tsar in February 1917, every other left-wing party but Lenin and the Bolsheviks leant their support to the “patriotic war” and to the alleged “defense” of the February revolution against German attacks (known as “revolutionary defensism”, It was largely the fact that the Bolsheviks, [32] alone of all the parties, called for an unconditional end to the war that won them the support of the Russian people. But Lenin was careful in explaining to the Bolsheviks that, in spreading their line on the war and against defensism, they must patiently explain to and not antagonize those masses who still suffered from pro-war illusions:

The slogan “Down with the War!” is, of course, correct. But it fails to take into account the specific nature of the tasks of the present moment and the necessity of approaching the broad mass of the people in a different way. It reminds me of the slogan “Down with the Tsar!” with which the inexperienced agitator of the “good old days” went simply and directly to the countryside and got a beating for his pains. The mass believers in revolutionary defensism are honest … i.e. they belong to classes (workers and the peasant poor) which in actual fact have nothing to gain from annexations and the subjugation of other peoples …

The rank-and-file believer in defensism regards the matter in the simple way of the men in the street: “I don’t want annexations, but the Germans are ‘going for’ me, therefore I’m defending a just cause and not any kind of imperialist interests at all.